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Besides outlining the territorial boundaries of a na­
tion’s sovereignty, a map delineates those areas to 
which this sovereignty is delegated and within which 
it is exercised. The map in this sense portrays a 
spatial organization of the administrative process. 
Take the United States as an example: its govern­
ance is defined spatially by fifty states—the Federal 
Union. Within each state, a hierarchy of adminis­
trative responsibility is in turn mapped by counties, 
townships and municipalities. Accompanying these, 
territorial divisions at the local level—school, wa­
ter and sanitation districts—integrate specialized 
administrative functions of governance. Functional 
specialization and decentralization by administrative 
area hold for the federal government as well: the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, Federal Reserve and 
Internal Revenue Districts. For each of these exam­
ples, at both federal and state levels, a single or 
coordinate administrative task is assigned to a geo­
graphic area or region.
This assignment has been and remains an «abid­
ing administrative problem», not only for the United 
States, but for all nation-states.’ In the past, po­
litical expedience and historical precedence provided 
the criteria by which administration was organiz­
ed territorially; on the map, frequently the limits 
of authority were simply arbitrarily drawn. Once 
set, these ad hoc boundaries tend to create an in­
herent inflexibility in the administrative process; 
boundaries become inviolate, all too often making 
an administrative system non-adaptive and incapa­
ble of dealing with social and economic change.2
So, if the administrative areas of the past are con­
sidered within contemporary environments, forces of 
change have made some areas obsolete, and past 
approaches to the territorial organization of admin­
istration inadequate. With this, new scales and 
forms of territorial organization have been propos­
ed whereby administrative areas are comprehensive 
and functional in scope and spatially related to 
the socio-economic forces with which they deal. Often 
referred to as a «new regionalism», proposals along 
these lines are evident throughout the world. At the 
international level, they underlie the European Eco­
nomic Community; in the United States, the «new 
regionalism», originally publicized and studied by
1. James W. Fesler, Area and Administration, University 
of Alabama Press, 1964, p.l. Also see Administration in Devel­
oping Countries, The Theory of Prismatic Society, Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1964.
2. Merrill Jensen, Regionalism in America, Madison, The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1965, p. 3b. Within this volume 
John Gaus raises the point: «...a system of law and adminis­
tration with its network of functional interrelationships once 
developed comes to have great potency for its own self-conti­
nuance and for shaping many of the other aspects of the re­
gional complex of life which it enhances» (p. 390).
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the National Resources Planning Board, gained re­
newed impetus through the Public Works and Econ­
omic Development Act of 1965. The Act provides 
for six to nine regional «action» commissions to 
plan economic development. Programs of a similar 
type have emerged in the United Kingdom and in 
Italy. But perhaps the most ambitious was that pro­
posed for France, where administrative reforms set 
forth in the 1969 referendum called for twenty-one 
regions to which new elements of administrative au­
thority were to be assigned. Other examples, such 
as metro-governments for Dade County, Florida, 
and Toronto, Canada, evidence similar attempts to 
reorganize administration along functional territo­
rial lines.
Whether international, national or local, these ex­
amples suggest a continuing attempt to change the 
territorial dimensions of administrative organization 
to have them correlate more closely than before 
with socio-economic forces. And, through this re­
ciprocity, administration supposedly becomes a more 
realistic instrument of direction and control.
In the Union of Soviet Republics, regionalization 
of this kind has influenced administrative organiza­
tion for over four decades. It underlies administra­
tive reforms in the Soviet Union implemented be­
tween 1957 and 1965; it remains a point of concern 
to Soviet governance: specifically, the planning and 
management of modernization and economic growth.
In its broadest sense, this discussion examines 
this idea. More directly, it traces a conflict between 
institutional territoriality and functional or econom­
ic regionalization in the Soviet Union which creates 
a counterforce to administrative change—-spatial 
inertia.
conceptual framework
Assignment of administration to area in the So­
viet Union differs from that of most countries. Ex­
tending beyond mere supervision and hierarchical 
responsibility, Soviet administration touches upon 
all aspects of control within a politico-economics sys­
tem and the realization of that control.1 For some, 
this point of view has fixed the operation of what 
they call a command economy.2 The administrative 
process in this model displays clear-cut boundaries 
for behavior, and (the concept of) control focuses 
on the issuance and implementation of orders; pat­
1. Harold J. Berman, Justice in the USSR, New York, 
Vintage Books, 1963, p. 116.
2. See: Chapter One, John P. Hardt, et al., Mathematics
and Computers in Soviet Economic Planning, New Haven,
Yale University Press, 1967, and Gregory Grossman, Economic
Systems, Foundation of Modern Economics Series, Engle­
wood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1967, Chapter 6.
terns and ranges of messages are predetermined and 
they are usually diagrammed as an administrative 
pyramid. Keeping in line with this imagery, execu­
tive authority resides in a high command which 
oversees operations. Its efficiency, in turn, is measur­
ed by the limited deviation of the system’s perfor­
mance from the orders set by the «command».
Though this command perception of the Soviet 
system holds to a large degree, its para-military bias 
is misleading and sometimes caricatures the admin­
istrative process. Too often, this popular image of 
the system pictures the Soviet Union as being run 
by pushbutton from Moscow.3 Rather than assume 
this authoritarian concreteness and structural clo­
sure, Soviet administration, though authoritative, is 
more open, and structurally more ambiguous. It 
more closely resembles a collectivity. When this as­
sociation is recognized, a different imagery is drawn. 
Examined from the outside, the Soviet Union dis­
plays «uniformity through collective symbols, objec­
tives and formalization of decision-making on be­
half of the system as a whole».4 But when dissected, 
the Soviet Union presents a less orderly picture, in 
which complex, perhaps indefinable, associations of 
suppliers, customers and bureaucrats interact. Flierar- 
chical responsibilities and commands remain per­
tinent to this environment, but the Euclidian order­
liness implied by the command paradigm is restrain­
ed. Instead, administration becomes a constant 
battle to maintain and establish control over the 
system—setting priorities for action; mobilizing re­
sources; measuring the success of operations; creat­
ing system objectives; and regulating change. Some­
times these tasks work in harmony, other times 
they oppose each other. Together they outline the 
sets of communications and behavioral responses 
which go to make up Soviet administration.
In their abstract form, they can be arrayed as ad­
ministrative spaces not unlike Boudeville’s idea of 
programming space.5 Different, however, from that 
by interpreting control rather than economic devel­
opment, administrative space encompasses two spa­
tial imageries: one of domains, the other of sur­
faces.6 As an abstract space within the administra­
tive process, a domain systematizes communication 
and feedback as duties and responsibilities portray­
ed as hierarchical relationships. For the Soviet sys­
tem this sequence directs the economy. Carrying
3. Berman, !oc. cit., p. 107.
4. See Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser, Economy and 
Society, The Free Press, 1956, p. 15.
5. J. R. Boudeville, Problems of Regional Economic Planning, 
Edinburgh at the University Press, 1966, pp. 16-18.
6. For background to this imagery see: Georges Matore, 
L'Espace Humain—l'Espression de l'Espace dans la Vie, la Pensée 
et l'Art Contemporains, Paris, La Columbe, 1961, pp. 61-83.
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this idea forward, and if transposed to territorial 
space, domains of administrative space emerge as 
an ordered hierarchy of administrative areas such 
as the township, county and state sequence in the 
United States or the raion, oblast and union-repub­
lic in the Soviet Union.
The second spatial imagery of administration deals 
with control as a series of message surfaces. Here, 
the vertical linearity associated with hierarchies 
gives way to a horizontal surface in which spatial 
continuity is derived from integrating and coordinat­
ing operations among activities or message centers. 
For the Soviets, administrative control over these 
emerges out of an optimal configuration of messages 
which, if translated into their territorial inter­
connections, stands as an economic region. Long 
ago, the Soviets described this notion as a function­
al regionalization «comprising objectively exist­
ing real economic combination».1 To them, functional­
ism or economic regionalization specified a logical 
union between area and administration.2
Twice in their history, 1918-1928 and 1957-1965, 
the Soviets moved toward this union; both times 
they failed because of an inherent contradiction be­
tween functional regional division and the institu­
tional territoriality associated with political systems.
For the Soviet Union, functional regionalization 
touches upon three organizing constraints: (1) na­
tional development planned by a central executive 
authority and executed by individuals or groups ei­
ther directly or indirectly responsible to that author­
ity; (2) democratic centralism; and (3) federalism. 
By setting priority sequences of events beforehand, 
central planning frames action patterns; it guides 
change and maintains structure by acting as a con­
trol mechanism for the system’s collectivity. Once 
planning sets the system’s direction, then manage­
ment, through the administrative process, trans­
lates plan into reality; this step, in turn, is governed 
by a second precept—democratic centralism. Here, 
administration turns to behavioral limits whereby 
democratic centralism regulates administration or­
ganization and response by vesting executive author­
ity in a high command—the centrality so often as­
sociated with the command model. As the origin of 
the decisions which determine action, the central 
executive authority sets forth policy binding through­
out the country. This objective confronts a third 
precept—an administration which is federal in form 
and organized along ethnic distinctions—the Union
1. Ekonomicheskoe Raionirovanie Rossi, Moskva, 1962, p. 5.
2. See: Jean-Louis Quermonne, «Planification régionale 
et reforme administrative», Institut d’Études Politiques de 
PUniversité de Grenoble, Administration Traditionelle et Plani­
fication Régionale, Cahiers, Libraire Armand Colin, 1964,
p. 89.
of Soviet Socialist Republics. Fifteen in number, 
the union-republics of the Soviet Union are grant­
ed sweeping executive and administrative powers. 
They have, for example, the right to govern their 
foreign relations with other sovereign states; they 
may exchange representatives and conclude agree­
ments with foreign governments. Union-republics can 
raise military forces and they are given the right 
to secede from the union. At first glance these pow­
ers are suggestive of an independent nation-state. 
But the fifteen union-republics are not sovereign, 
since they do not control their own destinies. Con­
trol rests elsewhere. Though they are delegated 
broad powers by the Soviet Constitution of 1936, 
that document also includes the provisos which 
prevent their being exercised. The exclusive right, 
for example, to regulate rests in the hands of the 
central government since it may abrogate actions of 
the union-republics. Furthermore, whereas federal­
ism implies a territorial balance of administrative 
power in which both national and regional interests 
are recognized, in the Soviet Union regional interests 
are paid lip-service, while national interests govern 
administrative action at all levels. As far as seces­
sion is concerned, no comment is necessary.
Taking all these restrictions into account, one 
concludes that the union-republics do not form a 
federal union in the true sense of the phrase; rather, 
each represents a single domain within a centraliz­
ed administrative organization.
And yet, political federalism remains a critical 
aspect to area and administration in the Soviet 
Union; for as Gaus and Jensen suggest, once purpose 
is assigned to area it creates a network of commu­
nication and identification which is practically self 
-perpetuating.3 Time and again this institutional 
territoriality represented by the union-republics 
has compounded the control of planning and admin­
istration and has conditioned attempts to imple­
ment a functional regionalization of the administra­
tive process. This conflict hindered and continues 
to hinder practical applications of a «new regional­
ism» in the Soviet Union; it is clearly evidenced 
by the history of Soviet administrative regionaliza­
tion.
historical evolution
Recognizing quite early in their history (1918) 
that modernization produces incongruities between 
administrative space and the territory it serves, the 
Soviets saw functional regionalism as an answer to 
the problem. Somewhat similar to Western thought 
covering spatial aspects of ecological organization,
3. Jensen, op. cit., p. 390.
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ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS, 1921
1. Northwest, 2. Northeast, 3. West, 4. Central Industrial, 5. Viat-Vetluzh, 6. Urals, 7. Central Volga, 8. Southwest, 9. South Mining Industrial,
10. Lower Volga, 11. Central Chernozem, 12. Caucasus, 13. Western Kirgizia, 14. Eastern Kirgizia, 15.Central Asia, 16. Western Siberia, 17. Kuznetsk- 
Altai, 18. Yenseisk, 19. Lena-Angarsk, 20. Yakut, 21. Far East.
early Soviet deliberations of administrative areas 
spoke of a spacial structure encompassing a «fun­
damental core» or «proletariat center»;1 peripheral 
to this center, a territory large enough to support 
«normal development of large industries» within 
the core marked out the outer limits of the region.2 
This core-peripheral imagery is clearly illustrated by 
Soviet use of the words «tiagotenie» and «vzaimode- 
istvie» to explain regional interrelations. Translat­
ed literally, they mean gravitation and mutual-de­
pendence, respectively, and bear striking resemblance 
to Christaller’s and Perroux’ imageries of regional 
forces or linkages.3
In an attempt by Soviet planners to carry out a 
territorial outline of these functional interdependen­
1. G.M. Krzhizhanovskii, Voprosy Ekonomicheskogo 
Raionirovaniia, Sbornik Materialov i Starei, 1917-1929, Moskva, 
1957, pp. 55-65.
2. Ibid.
3. Perroux speaks to an economic space as a «field of 
forces comprising centers from which centrifugal forces ema­
nate and to which centripetal forces are attracted». Cited in: 
John Friedman and William Alonso, Regional Development 
and Planning, Cambridge M.I.T. Press, 1964, pp. 26-27.
cies, Russia in 1921 was divided into twenty-one 
administrative regions (Figure 1). But given close 
examination, the regions are obviously more ad 
hoc than truly functional, many boundaries depend­
ing on parallels and meridians; nevertheless, the 
twenty-one regions stand as an earnest attempt to 
modernize administration.
Interestingly, the change in the administrative map 
specified to Soviet planners of the early twenties 
an economic federation within which national plan­
ning and economic management would be decentral­
ized, regional development stressed, and territorial 
recognition of ethnic groups disregarded.4 Some­
what similar to the regionalization proposed for 
France in 1969, this early Soviet plan sketched an 
administrative model in which spatial distinctions 
symbolized shared responsibility between central
Christaller talked about this centrality in terms of the relative 
importance of a center to a surrounding area through the 
«mutual dependence» between them. Walter Christaller, Cen­
tral Places in Southern Germany, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Engle­
wood Cliffs, N.J., 1966, Chapter A.
4. Krzhizhanovskii, loc. cit., pp. 126-28.
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FIGURE 2. Administrative Divisions, 1930
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS, 1930
1. Northern Krai, 2. Komi Autonomous Oblast, 3. Leningrad Oblast, 4. Karelian Oblast, 5. West Oblast. 6. Moscow Oblast, 7. Ivanovo Oblast, 
8. Nizhnigorod Oblast, 9. Marii Oblast, 10. Chuvash Autonomous Oblast, 11. Votskaia Autonomous Oblast, 12. Central Chernozem Oblast, 
13. Middle Volga Krai, 14. Mordovian Autonomous Oblast, 15. Upper Volga Krai, 16. Nemtsev Polvozhe, 17. Kalmyk Autonomous Oblast, 
18. North Caucasus Oblast, 19. Adygei Autonomous Oblast, 20. Cherkess Autonomous Oblast, 21. Karachaev Autonomous Oblast, 22. Kabardino- 
Balkar Autonomous Oblast, 23. North Oset Autonomous Oblast, 24. Ingush Autonomous Oblast, 25. Chechen Autonomous Oblast, 26. Dagestan 
ASSR, 27. Crimean ASSR, 28. Georgian SSR, 29. Abkhaz ASSR, 30. Adzhar ASSR, 31. South Oset AO, 32. Armenia SSR, 33. Azerba- 
idzhan SSR, 34. Nakhichev ASSR, 35. Nagorno-Karabakh AO, 36. Belorussian SSR, 37. Ukrainian SSR, 38. Tatar ASSR, 39. Bashkir ASSR, 
40. Urals Oblast, 41. Siberian Krai, 42. Oirot AO, 43. Yakut ASSR, 44. Buriat-Mongol ASSR, 45. Far East Krai. 46. Kazakh ASSR, 47. Kara- 
Kalpak AO, 48. Turkmen SSR, 49. Uzbek SSR, 50. Tadzhik SSR, 51. Gorno-Badakhshai AO, 52. Kirgiz ASSR.
and regional governments, not necessarily the central­
ized control associated with the command para­
digm.
Events show that economic federation and function­
al administrative regions were discarded. Just as in 
France, spatial forces seemed to have prevented 
change. First, existing administrative areas carried 
over from Czarist times acted as a conservative 
factor. Though admittedly impossible to document, 
it seems logical to expect even a revolutionary sit­
uation to have political and economic interests link­
ed to existing areas standing as a roadblock to ad­
ministrative change. Furthermore, and more impor­
tant to future events, the institutional territoriality 
then emerging (1922-24) as the Union of Soviet So­
cialist Republics downgraded any major alterations 
in administrative areas.1 Coming as it did almost
1. Federal union was not immediate. It evolved gradually. 
Of the fifteen union-republics presently part of the Soviet
simultaneously with the formation of a federal un­
ion predicated on the territorial integrity of ethnic 
groups, the proposed administrative regionaliza-
Union, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic re­
presents the origin of the union’s politico-economic power. 
The republic as originally framed (July 1918) covered all of 
what was «Great Russia». Included within these limits were 
autonomous regions and oblasts related to indigenous native 
populations. Provisional Soviet regimes also functioned in 
areas peripheral to the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the 
Belorussian SSR, the Armenian SSR, and the Azerbaidzhan 
SSR. Actual union of these did not occur until 1923. In July 
of that year the USSR was officially constituted. It incorpo­
rated four union-republics: the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, 
the Belorussian SSR, and the Trans-Caucasian SRSR (the 
Azerbaidzhan, the Armenian and the Georgian SSR’s). Two 
groups, the Bukhara People’s Soviet Republic and the Khorezm 
Socialist Republic, were bound by treaty to the union. In 1924 
the Uzhek and the Turkman SSR’s were organized. The Tadz­
hik people gained union-republic status in December 1929. 
Great Britain Foreign Office, Soviet Russia, His Majesty’s 
Stationery Office, London, 1924.
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tion introduced a set of spatial entities conflicting 
with these groups.
Thus it is not surprising to find the Soviets hedg­
ing against administration innovation. Instead of 
initiating a «new regionalism», the Central Execu­
tive Committee in March of 1963 accepted the plan 
to reform the administrative map of Russia in prin­
ciple, but postponed its implementation.1 So when 
the Soviet Union embarked on «its great change» 
in 1928, its administrative map was a conglomerate 
of some fifty-two units, a few supposedly function­
al in design, others ethnic, and the remainder those 
held over from Czarist days (Figure 2).
Obviously the pot-pourri bears slight resemblance 
to the twenty-one regions originally proposed. In­
stead, the fifty-two units illustrate the next thirty 
years, when centralized decision-making structure 
governed and in which area was incidental to admin­
istrative control. A ministerial system managed the 
nation and, with the exception of the union-repub­
lics where area and administration were linked 
through the chance location of certain industries, 
administrative space translated into a discontinuous 
territory in which functional territorial distinctions 
were irrelevant.
Up to 1957, this situation characterized Soviet ad­
ministration. Nevertheless, during the interim period, 
the Soviets continued to wrestle with the regional­
ization problem. At first, rather than stressing area 
and administration directly, Soviet attention center­
ed on the geographic distribution of capital invest­
ments. Evidencing this, the Eighteenth Party Con­
gress (March 10-21, 1939) spoke to the problems of 
territorial organization of economic growth and 
the definition of so-called territorial complexes as 
economic regions.2 Unlike the core-peripheral idea 
applied to earlier deliberations, the Soviets viewed 
functional division as being predicated on two spa­
tial constructs: a territorial industrial complex and 
a regional complex.3 In the first—industrial nodes 
outlining common supply—customer relationships 
serve as regional criteria. For example, some capi­
tal investments were defined by planners as coal- 
metallurgial bases. Mirroring this nineteenth centu­
ry association between industrialization, metals, and 
coal, a metallurgical base premised regionalization
1. Between 1923 and 1926 administrative regulation was 
carried out in the Urals, North Caucasus, Siberia and Far 
East. The oblast, raion, volost system was introduced in the 
Ukraine, Belorussia and Turkmenia. Henri Chambre, L'Ame­
nagement du Territoire en URSS. Introduction à l'Etude des 
Régions Economiques Soviétiques, Mouton Co„ 1959, Paris, 
p. 52.
2. KPSS V Rezolyotsiiakh i Resheniiakh Svezdov Konferent- 
sii i Plenumov Ts/c izd, 7, Gospolitizdat, 1954, p. 355.
3. A.E. Probst, Razmeshchenie Sotsialisticheskoi Pro-
myshlennosti, Moskva, 1962, p. 107.
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through mapping interdependencies between certain 
industries such as iron, steel, coal and electric pow­
er.4 Other discussions of the territorial industrial 
complex described them as large industrial nodes 
from which planners sought economic advantages 
in raw materials, energy resources and transport 
development. Where grouped together as sets of in­
dustrial nodes, these then mapped what the Soviets 
classified as a regional complex.5
Following this line of reasoning, planners devel­
oped a system of economic regions or «hearths», 
which consolidated existing administrative areas in­
to larger regions;6 over a period of five years these 
included first a set of five, then nine, and finally 
thirteen (1944) (Figure 3).
Though these regions bore no direct involvement 
with the administrative process, they are important 
for several reasons. Their formation expanded the 
Soviet concept of functional division beyond what 
it had been in the twenties; now it clearly emerged 
as economic regionalization in which functional in­
terdependencies touched upon production and mar­
ket processes. Equally important, these regions pre­
sented an alternative spatial system to the one mapp­
ed by the federal union and other administrative 
units. Somewhat reinforcing this alternative, Soviet 
administration after 1942 utilized the economic re­
gions for data collection and long-term planning. In 
this capacity, they were «general planning regions» 
and initiated a weak tie between regionalization and 
the administrative system.7
Up until May of 1957, when the entire administra­
tive structure for planning and management chang­
ed, this tie remained tenuous. But with the dramatic 
reforms carried forward by Khrushchev at that 
time, the ministerial system gave way to what was 
called the «territorial principle». This idea draws 
heavily upon previous deliberations of administrative 
regionalization by emphasizing area as a basis for 
coordinating the administrative process. According
4. See N.N. Kolosovskii, Budushchee Ural-Kuznetsliogo 
Rombinola, Moskva, 1932, p. 29. See also his article, «The 
Territorial-Production Combination», Journal of Regional 
Science, Voi. 3, No. 1, 1961, p. 2.
5. Probst, op. cit.
6. P. M. Alampiev, Ekonomicheskoe Raionirovanie SSSR, 
Moskva, 1959, p. 174. These regions are referred to in a va­
riety of ways: general planning regions, base economic regions 
and macro-regions. See G.N. Cherdantsev, Ekonomicheskaia 
Geograffiia SSSR, Moskva, 1956, p. 16; N.F. Ianitskii, «K. 
voprosy o meodike ekonomicheskogo raionirovaniia Euro- 
perkikh stran narodnoi demokratii», Izvestiia Akademii Nauk, 
Seriia Geograficheskaia, No. 6, 1957, p. 128.
7. Recent discussions use the terms large scale, average 
scale and small scale regions. The first type includes union- 
republics, parts of union-republics and groups of union-re- 
publics. V.V. Kistanov, Kompleksnoe Razvitie i Spetsilizatsiia 
Khoziaistva Ekonomicheskikh Raionov, Moskva, 1965, p. 28.
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FIGURE 3. General Planning Regions, 1944
GENERAL PLANNING REGIONS, 1944
I. Northwest, 2. North, 3. Central, 4. Povolzhe, 5. North Caucasus, 6. Urals, 7, Western Siberia, 8. Eastern Siberia, 9. Far East, 10. West,
II. South, 12. Caucasus, 13. Kazakhstan and Central Asia.
to Khrushchev, this involved a «shift in the center 
of gravity of the operational guidance of the economy 
closer to the enterprises.1 Because of their location 
within a predetermined area, certain industries be­
came responsible to the administrative machinery 
assigned to that area. At first the Soviets hinted 
that these areas would be functional regions, twenty 
-five to thirty in number.2 Subsequently, the union- 
republics were substituted. They were then further 
subdivided into 105 economic administrative regions 
representing the responsibility of a new administra­
tive body—the regional economic council or sovnar- 
khoz.
Dragged literally out of the past, the councils serv­
ed as a grassroots instrument for controlling the 
economy. For example, all industries within their 
territorial limits with two hundred or more employees 
came under the council’s purview. At its onset the 
council selected directors of enterprises; members 
of the sovnarkhoz were appointed by the union-re­
public; the sovnarkhozy supervised fulfillment of
1. Izvestiia, March 30, 1957.
2. Ibid., Feb. 12, 1957.
plans (particularly budgeting) such as enterprise 
accounts and investment capital construction with­
in their boundaries; they were also responsible for 
research and development to improve productivity 
and efficiency of operation.3 In reality, the council 
itself constituted a formidable organization which 
stood as a microcosm of the bureaucracy it had re­
placed. In this sense Khrushchev did shift the center 
of gravity of management.4
Whether or not the «territorial principle» truly 
tied administration to functionally determined areas 
—this can certainly be challenged. But even with the 
lack of a true economic regionalization, the 1957 
reforms drastically altered administrative space and 
in the process utilized territorial space as the con-
3. For a detailed discussion of the regional economic coun­
cil and its responsibilities, see: Philip J. Bernard, Planning in 
the Soviet Union, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1966, pp. 113-18. 
See also: Alec Nove, The Soviet Economy: An Introduction, 
New York, Praeger, University Series, 1961, pp. 67-73.
4. Of the 105 councils, ninety-four operated within the 
confines of four union-republics: the RSFSR, the Ukrainian 
SSR, the Kazakh SSR and the Uzbek SSR. Each remaining 
economic administrative region coincided with union-republic 
boundaries.
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trolling device to set down communication and 
feedback. Furthermore (and frequently overlooked), 
the institutional territoriality of the Federal Union 
exerted itself : the union-republics rose to a new lev­
el of importance, for without the ministerial sys­
tem, middle management of the economy clearly 
fell to the union-republics and their sub-domains, 
the sovnarkhozy. Some Western writers interpreted 
this rearrangement as a decentralization of planning 
and management.1 But the administrative changes 
premised a more immediate and pragmatic policy 
even though they drew heavily on the Soviet dis­
cussions of the twenties. Khrushchev simply juggl­
ed the administration’s table of organization to ef­
fect better communication to, and therefore control 
from, the center.
This centralization is clearly evidenced by the plann­
ing procedures in which the burden for planning 
fell to Gosplan and its subsidiary agencies, the re­
public gosplans. Moreover, abolishing the min­
istries reduced the central decision-maker’s span of 
control to fifteen (the number of union-republics re­
porting to the center) and, on paper at least, prob­
lems associated with the ministerial system decreas­
ed. This meant the «administrative distance» that had 
prevailed between the central executive and the en­
terprises it directed was reduced.
Great as were their expectations, the reforms of 
1957 never did remedy the difficulties the Soviets 
faced. First of all, the union-republics failed to live 
up to the management responsibilities handed to 
them; they were equipped neither in terms of per­
sonnel nor past experience to do so. In much the same 
vein Gosplan either could not carry out its tre­
mendous responsibilities, or else the leadership saw 
too much power vested in one agency and thus 
was not totally committed to the change. Another 
roadblock to meaningful administration touched the 
economic administrative regions. As arbitrary group­
ings of oblasti, they were a far cry from the function­
al divisions called for in a «new regionalism». Pre­
dictably, administrative boundaries cut across exist­
ing territorial industrial complexes. Wherever region­
al coherence had previously existed, the reforms 
disrupted, and thereby destroyed, the basic assump­
tion for linking area with administration. Not on­
ly did these reforms disrupt existing territorial ties, 
but in addition the sovnarkhozy introduced a new 
set of regional commitments. Before 1957, planning 
and management had to contend with departmental­
ism. Now, the reforms introduced a practically i- 
dentical phenomenon—territorialism, or what the
1. See: R.W. Davies, «Decentralization of Industry»,
Soviet Affairs, April 1958, No. 4, Voi. 9, pp. 353-67; Oleg 
Hoeffging, «Soviet Industrial Reorganization of 1957», Ameri­
can Economic Review, Vol. XLIX, No. 2, p. 75.
US National Resources Committee (1935) had call­
ed a «balkanization» effect.2 Rather than empire 
building within a departmental context, each sov- 
narkhoz identified its operational goals with its ter­
ritory. This regional chauvinism injected an unfo­
reseen element of commitment into Soviet admin­
istration which weakened the entire purpose of the 
1957 reforms.
To remove these deficiencies and perhaps to 
strengthen centralized control over economic affairs, 
the administrative changes were gradually amended 
so that the bureaucracy once again began to concen­
trate within the central government. Between 1960 
and 1965 these amendments seemingly brought So­
viet governance full cycle and returned it to where 
it had been before 1957. For example, in July of 1960, 
the three republics (RSFSR, Ukraine and Kazakh) 
which contained the largest numbers of economic 
administrative regions organized republic sovnar­
khozy—Councils of the National Economy (VsNKh)— 
to coordinate the operations of the sovnarkhoz with­
in their respective boundaries. In April, 1961, as a 
further hint at a rearrangement of administrative 
organization, Coordinating and Work-Planning Coun­
cils were established. In this move, two weakness­
es in the regional economic councils were implied by 
the Soviets: first, the councils could not deal 
effectively with material and technical supply alloca­
tions; and secondly, regional administration requir­
ed larger areal units for effective integration of 
operation. Apparently with this in mind, the juris­
diction of the new councils was set down within 
seventeen new general planning regions (Figure 4). 
The Soviets then charged the councils with studying 
the integrated development of the economy and 
working out recommendations and proposals for 
the USSR Planning and Union-Republic Planning 
Commissions.3
In a further step towards reversing the 1957 re­
forms, the union-republic’s position within the ad-
2. US National Resources Committee, Regional Factors 
in National Planning and Development, Washington, US 
Government Printing Office, 1935, p. 82.
3. As part of this, the thirteen general planning regions, 
recognized since 1944, were increased by breaking some of 
them down into more detail. The Western Siberia region was 
reduced in size and some of its territory included within the 
Urals region; Central Asia and Kazakhstan were subdivided 
into separate entities; and what had previously been the North­
west and North regions were combined into a single area. Be- 
lorussia, which had been part of the Western region, was 
separated from it and excluded from the general planning cate­
gory—it remained simply an economic administrative union- 
republic region. The Central region was broken down into 
four parts: Central, Volga Viat, Central Chernozem, and 
Volga; and similarly the Southern region was subdivided into 
three components: Donets-Dnieper, Southeast and Southern. 
Ekonomicheskaia Gazeta, May 28, 1961, p. 2.
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FIGURE 4. General Planning Regions, 1961
GENERAL PLANNING REGIONS, 1961
1. Northwest, 2. Central, 3. Volga-Vyatka, 4. Central Chernozem, 5. Volga, 6. North Caucasus, 7. Urals, 8. Western Siberia, 9. Eastern Siberia, 
10. Far East, 11. Donets-Dnieper, 12. Southwest, 13. South, 14. West, 15. Transcaucasus, 16. Central Asia, 17. Kazakhstan.
Belorussia and Moldavia SSR classified as economic administrative regions.
ministrative hierarchy was downgraded. For exam­
ple, specialized committees identical to ministries 
were organized within the central bureaucracy. In 
number and complexity these rivaled the admin­
istrative units of the ministerial system. A Su­
preme USSR Council of the National Economy ap­
peared in the table of organization. Acting through 
the union-republics, the Supreme Council directed 
the regional economic councils. Union-republics lost 
additional responsibilities when Gosplan became 
an All-Union operation, with union-republic plann­
ing commissions reporting directly to the central 
executive instead of to the union-republic Council 
of Ministers. A new agency, the USSR State Com­
mittee for Construction Affairs (Gostroi), assumed 
direction of capital construction, a job previously 
delegated to the republic’s sovnarkhozy. Material 
and technical supply allocation was also recentraliz­
ed. Thus by 1962 the Soviets had modified the 1957 
reforms to the extent that the «center of gravity» 
Khrushchev had defined had clearly shifted back to 
a central bureaucracy.
Continuing their reforms of the original reforms, 
the Soviet leadership carried out a consolidation of
the economic administrative regions into forty-sev­
en areas (Figure 5). In this change some bounda­
ries were redrawn, possibly to effect a more func­
tional mapping of economic communities in the 
Soviet Union. Significantly, the Soviets appeared to 
be shaping a policy in which economic regionali­
zation replaced national determination and acted as 
an instrument of furthering centralized control, 
and setting the union-republics aside. For example, 
in a statement appearing in the Ekonomicheskaia 
Gazeta (May 28, 1961) writers indicated the «boun­
daries of the union-republics set as they are by 
nationality do not coincide with present day eco­
nomic borders». And when the consolidation of ad­
ministrative regions took place in 1962, for the first 
time economic administrative boundaries clearly cut 
across those of the union-republics and lesser na­
tionality-based administrative units. Totally ignor­
ing nationality and its associated institutional ter­
ritoriality, one sovnarkhoz united the four Central 
Asian republics under a single administration res­
ponsible to the central government. In key mat­
ters of planning and management—construction, ma­
terial and technical supplies and, most important
51
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FIGURE 5. Economic Administrative Regions, 1063
ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS, 1963
1. Upper Volga, 2. Volga-Vyatka, 3. East Siberia, 4. Far East, 5. West Siberia, 6. Western Urals, 7. Komi, 8. Krasnoyarsk, 9. Kuznetsk Basin, 
JO. Leningrad, 11. Moscow City, 12. Moscow, 13. Murmansk, 14. Lower Volga, 15. Volga, 16. Oka, 17. Northeast, 18. Northwest. 19. North Caucasus, 
20. Central Volga, 21. Central Urals, 22. Khabarovsk, 23. Central Chernozem. 24. Southern Urals, 25. Donetsk, 26. Kiev, 27. Lvov. 28. Podolsk, 
29. Dnieper, 30. Kharkov, 31. Black Sea, 32. Belorussian, 33. Central Asia, 34. Alma Ata, 35. East Kazakhstan, 36.West Kazakhstan, 37. Karaganda, 
38. Semipalatinsk, 39. Virgin Land, 40. South Kazakhstan, 41. Georgian, 42. Azerbaidzhan, 43. Lithuanian, 44. Moldavian, 45. Latvian, 46. Arme­
nian, 47. Estonian.
for that area, irrigation and water supply—the Cen­
tral Asian sovnarkhoz reported directly to the 
USSR Supreme Council for the Economy. This 
apparent usurping of certain union-republics’ prero­
gatives suggested that the general planning regions 
might assume an administrative role formerly de­
legated to the union-republics. Indeed, administra­
tive changes up to 1964 opened possibilities for ad­
ministrative control from the center based solely on 
economic regionalization. On this basis, the territo­
riality associated with the federal union could have 
been eliminated entirely.
Just how far this trend might have been carried 
will never be known, for beginning in 1965 adminis­
trative organization performed a complete about- 
face. Internal and economic pressures after Khrush­
chev’s fall unleased additional changes in adminis­
trative and alternative paths to centralization.
As suggested earlier, Khrushchev had sought the 
answer to the administrative dilemma by deconcen­
trating and rearranging administration structure 
according to the territorial principle. Turning away 
from this approach, Brezhnev and Kosygin res­
tored the ministerial system. Administrative space 
was divided (once again) into domains according 
to All-Union and Union-Republic ministries. Central 
control extended through five state commitees: those 
for agriculture; science and technology; planning 
(Gosplan); construction (Gostroi); and material and 
technical supplies. The domain and responsibilities 
of the last clearly revealed the degree to which the 
central executive maintained its sovereignty over the 
economic system. Controlling over seventy per cent 
(by value) of the economy’s supply inputs, the ma­
terials and technical supply committee, through 
its territorial agencies, governed the movement of
52
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production between suppliers and customers no 
matter what their department subordination.1 In 
this sense, the administration, after 1965, held even 
tighter control than before.
The leadership abandoned the sovnarkhozy, and 
its related central agencies, such as the USSR Coun­
cil of the Economy, and, most important, indirectly 
returned the union-republics to the apex of the ter­
ritorial hierarchy for administration. Almost tragic, 
perhaps comical, in its historical proportions, the 
significance of the union-republics was again extoll­
ed. In his initial statement, «On Improving the Or­
ganization of Management», Kosygin envisaged an 
«emphasis on the economies of the country’s repub­
lics and regions with expansion of the economic pow­
ers of the republics».2 A speech by Lepeshkin, a 
Soviet expert on public law, called for a «restudy 
of the relationship between the center and the re­
public, especially now when the experiment in sett­
ing up individual major economic regions and form­
ing inter-republic economic bodies with them has
1. See lu. Koldomasov, «Razvitie priamykh khoziaist- 
vennykh sviazei i sovershenstvovanie raspredeleniie sredstv 
proizvodstva», Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 11, 1965, p. 20; Ekono- 
micheskaia Gazeta, No. 26, 1966, p. 4; Pravda, Dec. 12, 1966, 
pp. 2-3.
2. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Oct. 13, 1965, Voi.
XVII, No. 38, pp. 8-13; Pravda, Oct. 29, 1965, pp. 2-3.
failed to justify itself.3 Significantly, this public re­
cognition of economic regionalization’s failure and 
a possible re-emphasis on the union-republics for 
planning and management underscores the repub­
lics’ durability over time.
conclusions
Time and again this territoriality associated with 
the federal union has reasserted itself; and it re­
mains one of the most persistent forces to be reckon­
ed with in Soviet administration. In fact, today some 
Soviets indicate that even if ethnic distinctions 
disappeared, the federal structure might be retain­
ed for economic administrative purposes.4 So, as 
far as administrative regionalization is concerned, 
area and administration in the Soviet Union remain 
linked by forces other than economic rationalism. 
And the Soviet Union’s failure to implement an ad­
ministrative system based on functional spatial cri­
teria reveals what Wirth has already noted as one 
of the inherent difficulties of economic regionaliza­
tion in any modern state. «Boundaries emerge out 
of social and political strife and are not always the 
result of rational reflection».6
3. Cited in Alexander Balinby, et at., Planning and the 
Market in the USSR: The 1960's, New Brunswick, N.J., 
Rutgers University Press, 1967, pp. 77-78.
4. Ibid.
5. Louis Wirth, «Localism, Regionalism and Centraliza, 
tion», American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XLII, Jan, 1937' 
p. 494.
Εις το προσεχές τεύχος θά δημοσιευθή συζήτησις επί του θέματος των 
άρθρων των συνεργατών τής ’ Επιθεωοήσεως Κοινωνικών ’Ερευνών, κ.κ. Κ. Παπα- 
γεωργΐου («Τό περιφερειακόν πρόβλημα τής Ελλάδος», τεύχος 13) καί Δ. 
Πλέσσα καί Κλ. Ντάβου («The Greek regional problem: some analytic and 
policy perspectives», τεύχος 14).
Discussion on the articles written by the collaborators of The Greek Review 
of Social Research, Mr. C. Papageorgiou («The regional problem of Greece», 
issue No. 13) and D. Plessas and Cl. Davos («The Greek regional problem: 
some analytic and policy perspectives», issue No. 14) will be published in the 
forthcoming issue.
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